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THE NEWLY DISENFRANCHISED:
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT WITHHELD
Herman R. Brown, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, Blacks and women have been denied their constitutional rights
based strictly on race and sex. This brand of disenfranchisement has in many
instances made these groups feel like "second class" citizens. Although
recently, these groups have been able to share in some rights previously
withheld, the "playing field of equality of rights" is still not level. For
example, women still earn less pay for comparable work performed by their
male counterparts. Blacks continue to be shut out of the system based strictly
on race.
Just as women and Blacks have been denied their rights, other groups have
suffered similar indignities. In recent years a new disenfranchised group has
emerged demanding their equal rights also. This groups' disenfranchisement
is not based on race, gender, national origin or any other immutable
characteristic that has been deemed worthy of protection by the courts. This
new group-has been stigmatized and discriminated against based on their sexual
orientation. Although this group has made gains in recent years, they contend
that they not only want to be treated as "normal" people, but they too demand
equal rights. Chief among these rights, they demand the right to marry. I
contend that this right should be granted. After all, the laws should be applied
in an even-handed way regardless of how people may personally feel about the
issue of same-sex marriage.
We must not forget, for example, that no matter how repugnant the Ku Klux
Klan might be to some, they have been afforded the right to obtain permits to
march down public streets and exemplify their symbols of hate. It is therefore
beyond any justifiable legal reasoning as to why this hate is sanctioned by the
state, but the open love shared by gay couples is stifled by the state's denial
of a marriage license, which symbolizes their love.
The courts have steeped this denial of rights in what is deemed tradition.
However, what is deemed traditional is not dispositive on the issue of what is
legally correct. Therefore, it is time for courts to become aware of the
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changing traditions in society. These new traditions embrace equal rights for
all, including those whose lifestyle is different from the status quo. This
difference encompasses a new type of couple. A duo far removed from our
once beloved television couple, Ozzie & Harriet. A quick glance back at the
"Ozzie & Harriet Age" will undoubtedly reveal that the 1950's are now but a
distant traditional memory.
The year was 1953. The TV show that everyone admired was Ozzie and
Harriet,"' which depicted the perfect "nuclear" (American as apple pie) family.
American families aspired to imitate this family. Ozzie went off to work while
Harriet stayed home to attend to the elements of the perfect homemaker. Dinner
was promptly served at a designated time and the conversation reflected .on the
daily activities of this perfect family. "It was seemingly a golden age of
innocence and inconsequence."2 Forty years later however, this world began to
disappear, and the very same television programming that we had come to
admire, began to deal with issues of social conflict, social change and even
moral dilemmas in the spheres of sexual behavior,3 and a very different type
of family order.
As we embark upon the 21st century, there is a rapid emergence of another
type of family, one that is far removed from Ozzie & Harriet. It is the type of
family structure for which many in our society are ill-prepared to cope with.
As recent as September 1991, a television show depicted a variation of this
new type of family, when it showed the viewing audience a purported marriage
ceremony between two men4 . This indicaties that television, like society, has
moved far beyond Ozzie & Harriet.
Just as television has changed, so too has the social order. But, has it
changed so much so that Ozzie can now marry Harry?
Societal progress has redefined the concept of family and thereby created a
legal dilemma. To solve these dilemmas in the past, society has often turned
to its legal arm, namely, the court system, to bring about some sort of
harmonious resolution to whatever threatened the status quo. Once again
society is faced with a legal dilemma, a challenge to the status quo, this
challenge encompasses the rights of homosexuals to marry.

1. J. Duden, TIMELINE5-1950 (1989).
2. S. liCHTER, L UcHIER & S. RoTHMAN, WATCHINo AMERICA: WHAT TELEVISION Ts
OUR LIVES 288 (1991).

3. Id at 81.
4. Roc (Fox Channel 5 broadcast, Sept. 1991).
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This paper will explore the concept of family and the reality of same-sex
marriages. Additionally this paper will examine the question of whether
marriage statutes (on their face or as applied) can withstand constitutional

scrutiny under an equal protection analysis.

THE FAMILY

Before entering into a discussion of whether same-sex marriage should be
allowed, it is necessary to discuss what constitutes a family. Since the concept
of family is largely founded on the existence of a marriage,5 the definition of
family is thus inextricably interrelated to the discussion of any court granting
or allowing same-sex marriages.
The definition of family has generally included: "two or more persons related
by birth, marriage, or adoption, who reside in the same household".6 Therefore,
a mandatory step toward any courts willingness to recognize same-sex
marriages would be for courts to recognize a changing social landscape and
redefine how they look at the concept of family.
Family is a concept central to our society. Family values are extolled by
politicians, families provide emotional and financial support, and family status.
determines many public and private benefits.7 Defining the family, then, is a
critical and far-reaching act.
Family has been defined many ways, one (commonly used and generally
accepted) definition is a follows: "[a] group of persons consisting of parents
and children; father, mother and their children."8 This dictionary definition
however, does not limit our inquiry, but begins our inquiry into what
constitutes a family in the 1990s. Although courts have traditionally defined
family by relationship of blood, marriage or adoption,9 they have reluctantly
begun to recognize the dramatic changes in the nature of the American family
that have taken effect over the last two decades. Indeed the traditional family
is gradually becoming the exception, rather than the rule.
The traditional family with a breadwinner-husband and a homemaker-wife
who live with their biological children is certainly an anomaly in America

5. Treuthart, Adopting A More Realistic Definition of 'Family, 26 Go.'
6.
7.
8.
9.

L REv. 91.92 (1990191).

Seligmann, Variations On A Theme, NEWswEE--SpEAL Eomov. WinierfSpring 1990, at 38.
Esseks, Redefining The Famiy-Braschi v. Stail Assocs 25 HARv. C.R - C.. REV. 183, (1990).
BLAcKs LAw DIcnoNARY 543 (5th ed. 1979).
Esseks, supra note 7.
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today.'0 Studies show that only "15% of the households in the United States
now match the once-standard definition of a family as a working husband,
homemaker wife, and children.""t
Although existing families have diverse characteristics, the functional aspects
of this basic social unit remain the same: the provision of love and support to
its members. [However], social institutions and the law have not kept up with
the changes in 'family' life. As a result, many groups which function as
families are not recognized as such, and are denied benefits which society
bestows upon families which resemble the traditional model, if only
superficially.'
Ultimately the solution requires the reevaluating of the basic assumptions
that legal distinctions place on marriage and family status.' 3 This type of
reevaluating by the courts has fortunately begun.
The New York Court of Appeals, in Braschi v. U.S. Army, for example
recognized this by expanding the definition of family beyond traditional
boundaries. The Court recently construed a rent-control statute's use of the
word "family" to include homosexual relationships: "[A] more realistic, and
certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners
whose relationship is long-term and characterized by an emotional and financial
commitment and interdependence." 4
In Braschi, Miguel Braschi and Leslie Blanchard were gay life partners.
Although the two men could not make their relationship official, they lived as
a couple for over 10 years. Their emotional bond was strong: they lived
together in the same apartment, maintained a faithful and exclusive
commitment to one another, and exchanged bracelets to symbolize, their
relationship.' 5 They linked their financial lives through joint bank accounts,
credit cards and safe deposit boxes.' 6 On September 1986 Leslie Blanchard
died.'
The landlord initiated proceedings to evict Braschi as an illegal holdover
tenant. To keep the apartment, Braschi sought a preliminary injunction barring
his eviction. He claimed that section 2204.6(d) of the New York Rent Control

10. Treuthart, supra note 5.
11. Los Angeles Tnes. Dec. 13, 1990, pt. A, at 3, col.2.
12. Treuthart supra note 5.
13. Id

14.
15.
16.
17.

Braschi v. Stahl Assocm, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
Id
Id at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 50, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
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regulations protected him from eviction since he was a member of the tenant
of record's surviving family."8 This provision prevented a landlord from
evicting, upon the death of the tenant, 'either the surviving spouses of the
deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant's family who has
been living with the tenant." 9
While the lower court in Braschi insisted that the term "family" included
only traditionally recognized family relationships, the appeals court abandoned
such formalistic rules and fashioned a flexible standard designed to protect the
fundamental elements of family. The court concluded its nontraditional analysis
by remarking: "[the] intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest
on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its
foundation in the reality of family life.""0 The Court went on to spell out the
Braschi-Blanchard relationship using a four-factor test of what constituted a
family: (1) the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship; (2) the level of
emotional and fimancial(3) the manner in which the parties conducted their
everyday lives and held themselves out to society; and (4) the reliance placed
upon one another for daily family services." Applying this test to "the reality
of the family life" of the pair, the court concluded that they were in fact
members of a family.'
The Appellate Division in New York recently followed the Braschi decision
in, East 10th StreetAssociation v. Goldstein. In that case the Court interpreted
the Rent Stabilization Code to protect gay partners as "family" members, even
though the statute specifically defined family to include husband, wife, son,
daughter and so forth." 23 Other courts have also broken with the conventional
definition of family. In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, the Court
rejected a strict traditional definition of family, instead recognizing that "the
importance of the family relationship, to the individuals involved and to the
society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of
daily association."2 4
Additionally, the majority in Zablocki v. Reidhal, also recognized this trend
toward a change in traditional definitions, and went as far as to say, recognition

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.at 206.
Id. at 212-213.

id.
Id.
Id
East 10th Street Associations v. Goldstein, 552 N.Y.S.2d 257 (App. Div. 1990).
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843 (1977).
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of changes in the nature of family life entails the evolution of the laws relating
to marriage.5
Similarly the legal definition of family was broadened in the case of Moore
v. City of East Cleveland. The Supreme Court granted constitutional protection
beyond nuclear families to extended families.2 6 The aforementioned examples
of the changing definitions of family illustrate how far some courts have moved
beyond the traditional definitions of family. Yet there are some detractors. For
example, commentators have explicitly stated that the Braschi holding should
be limited to the rent-controlled housing context. However, Braschi's spirit is
broader.27 To narrow the Braschi holding would be to misinterpret the broad
holding in the case involving the courts formulation of what constitutes a
family, regardless of the sex of the parties. Further, to narrow the Braschi
holding to its limited facts would not recognize that the new definition of
family is already having a widespread impact, 28 and may prove to be the first
of many steps toward the full recognition of the rights of nontraditional
families; chief among these rights should be the rights of homosexuals to
marry.
Therefore, when the Braschi holding is viewed in light of the above
argument, it is clear that it cannot be limited, but expanded to encompass the
ever changing social and familial landscape.
By further outlining the Braschi holding, I would submit that the new
definition of family includes; two lifetime partners whose relationship is longterm and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and
interdependence. 29 Despite the gradual emergence of new definitions of
family, and the courts seemingly becoming more liberal on the issue of what
constitutes a family, definitions of family are not dispositive of the inquiry of
whether same-sex marriages should be allowed.
Thus, we now turn to other issues that seen to inform the courts decision of
allowing same-sex marriages.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Esseks, supra note 9.
See e.g., Comment, The Legal Family-A Definitional Analysis, 13 J. FAM. L 781 (1973-74).
Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. 1989).
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THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGES:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE COURTS RESPONSE

The state has a compelling interest in fostering the traditional institution
of marriage (whether based on self preservation, procreation or in
nurturing and keeping alive the concept of marriage and family as a basic
fabric of society [This institution] is as old and as fundamental as our
entire civilization, which institution is deeply rooted and long established
in firm and rich societal values.
The legislature has chosen to restrict the right to marry to people of the
opposite sex, a classification which has a rational basis and which does
not offend the equal protection right of the Fourteenth Amendment or due
process."3

The above reasoning is echoed throughout the anals of judicial philosophy
and reasoning and has served as a shield against allowing homosexual
marriages. The literature surrounding this subject is replete with faulty
reasoning and evasive techniques, and the watchword, "tradition," (rather than
legal reasoning) has been the courts vehicle for denying same-sex marriages.
Most state statutes do not expressly prohibit same-sex

marriages."

However, when courts have been faced with the issue they have generally
found a way to deny such marriages, even though nontraditional definitions of
family have emerged. Every court that has considered the question of same-sex
marriage has taken the position that a lawful marriage can be entered into only
sex.3 2 To date no American state has
by two persons of [the] opposite
33
legalized same-sex marriages.

When same-sex couples have attempted to marry in states with statutory
schemes that lack specific guidance, courts have resorted to using dictionary
definitions and relying on common "custom and usage" to conclude that the
union must be between members of opposite sexes. 4

30. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W. 2d 185 (Minn. 1971). appeal dismLsed 409 U.S. 810 (1971).

31. Ingram, A Consttutional Critique of Restricrions On The Right To Marry-Why Can *tFred Marry
George-or Mary & Alice at the Same Turne, 10 . of CONT. LAW. 33, 38 (1949).

32. I
33. Treuthart supra note S.
34. 2 H. CLuy, THE LAW OF DOmESTC RElATioNs iN Ti

UNITED STATES 77 (1988).
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Commentators on the subject have gone so far as to argue that "thiss
prohibition has primarily ancient origins that can be found in the Bible.""
However, a historical overview of same-sex marriages (submitted by plaintiffs)
in a recent case., Craig Robert Dean v. District of Columbia, 6 seemingly
suggests otherwise. Even if there were a rational justification for this
restriction, it would appear that most of these restrictions no longer serve any
legitimate state interest in modem society.3 Their continual existence is a
result of the long standing presence in American society and law of a
remarkable symbiosis between widely held sacred and secular views of
marriage.3" It is time to review these restrictions and demand that some
credible medical or moral evidence be shown before we uphold laws that
shrink the area of choice in selecting a partner for marriage."
This type of forward thinking can be seen as early as 1897 when Justice
Holmes wrote,
it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was
laid down in the time of Henry the IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.4
Our current statutes and court decisions construing these statutes fall under
the rubric of what Justice Holmes called, "blind imitation of the past."
Even a cursory review of some of the cases addressing this issue reveal
nothing more than courts blindly holding on to tradition to justify their
reasoning rather than applying applicable principles of law.
For example, in Washington State, the Court of Appeals in Singer v.
Hara,4" strained to determine that no discrimination occurred on the basis of
sex in denying two men the opportunity to marry. The court based its holding
on its conclusion that the definition of marriage did not encompass the type of

35. See e.g., In Re The Estate of Owen C. Loughmiller, 629 P.2d 156,158 (1981) (Leviticus 18:6-24,
prohibiting consanguinity and affinity); Harris v. Alaska, 457 P.2d 638, 648.649 (Alaska 1969) (Leviticus
18:22 and 20:13, prohibiting homosexuality).
36. See generally, Plaintiffs Mern. On The History of Same-Sex Marriage.
37. Ingrain, supra note 31 at 39.
38. See Drinan, The Loving Decision & The Freedom to Marry, 29 O-1o ST. UI. 358, 380, App A
1968).
39. Id. at 365.
40. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L REv. 457, 469 (1897).
41. Singer v. Hara, 522 P. 2d 1187. 1195 (Wash. 1974).
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relationship plaintiffs desired to form. That marriage is 'the legal union of one
man and one woman" was implied from prior decisions in which the definition
was deemed by the court in each case to be so obvious as not to require
recitation, 2 and from the rule of statutory construction that words of a statute
must be used in their usual and ordinary sense."'
Other jurisdictions have considered whether statutory or ceremonial marriage
can be entered into by same-sex couples, and have uniformly held that it
cannot be." One such case is the landmark decision in Baker v. Nelson, in
which two males applied for a marriage license and the clerk declined to issue
one solely on the ground that they were of the same sex. The Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order quashing a writ of mandamus,
and directed that a marriage license not be issued.45 The court rejected the
argument that the absence of express statutory prohibition against same-sex
marriages showed a legislative intent to authorize such marriages. The court
resorting to the same type of language that courts have often used, found that
the statute used "marriage' as a term of common usage,"' meaning the state
of union between persons of the opposite sex, and referred to dictionary
definitions. Further in Anonymous v.Anonymous, the court held that a marriage
ceremony between two males did not in fact or law create a marriage!'
Similarly, Jones v. Hallahan,further exemplifies this phenomenon. The court
held that: "while Kentucky statutes neither specifically prohibited nor
authorized issuance of a marriage license to same-sex couples, the appellants
were prevented from marrying by48 their own incapability of entering into a
marriage as that term is defined.,
In Pennsylvania, this trend continued in Desanto v. Barnsley. The
Pennsylvania court reasoned: "As in other states, Pennsylvania's Marriage Law
does not define marriage, nor do we have any case that specifically states that
.marriage.' either common law or statutory, is limited to two persons of
opposite sex. Nevertheless, the inference that marriage is so limited is so
strong.-

49

42. Id at 1191-92.
43. Id at 1191, n.6.
44. Id
45. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Mimn. 1971), appealdismLswed, 409 U.S. 810 (1971).
46. Id at 186.

47. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup.CL 1971).
48. Tones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. App. 1973).

49. DeSanato v. Bamnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (1984).
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Although the Pennsylvania case dealt with common law marriage as opposed
to statutory marriage, the court made it clear that the result would be the same.
The following quote from In re Estate of Manfredi, is illustrative of this point:
"Marriage in Pennsylvania is a civil contract by which a man and a woman
take each other for husband and wife." s°
In, In the Matter of Estate of Cooper, the court adopted a different line of
reasoning. The court was asked to adopt the Braschi-Blanchard reasoning. It
however, declined the invitation and held: "a surviving partner of a homosexual
relationship could not elect to take under a partner's will as a surviving
spouse."5' The Cooper court further stated: "There is a great distinction
between being part of a family entitled to protection of rent control laws
because of public policy and legislative intent, and in being a surviving spouse
of a decedent." 2
There have been numerous arguments advanced by courts to deny same-sex
marriages. Courts generally rely on the following state interests to support the
prohibition against same-sex marriages:
(1) encourage procreation;
(2) encourage morality;
(3) encourage the traditional family;
(4) support laws prohibiting
homosexual acts;
53
ostracism.
social
(5) avoid
Of all the above choices, the courts, besides relying on
tradition, seem fascinated with the idea of prohibiting same-sex marriages based
on encouraging procreation. This can be seen in Singer v. Hara, where the
court stated in relevant part:
The fact remains that marriage exists as a protected legal institution
primarily because societal values associated with the propagation of the
human race. Further it is apparent that no same-sex couple offers the
possibility of birth of children by their union. Thus, the refusal of the state
to authorize same-sex marriages results from such impossibility of

50. In re Estate of Manfredi, 159 A.2d 697 (1960).

51. In the Matter of Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 687 (1990).
52. Id
53. Ingram, supra note 1.
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reproduction
rather than from an invidious discrimination on account of
4
sex.

5

This same language was echoed in a recent District of Columbia case. In that
case the plaintiffs instituted a lawsuit alleging that their application for a
marriage license was denied by the District of Columbia Marriage License
Bureau without lawful basis. The plaintiffs asserted, inter alia that the denial
of a marriage license by the Clerk to a couple of the same-sex violated the
statute authorizing marriages and is an invidious act of discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. The D.C. Government stated that the couple should
not be allowed to marry because,"to ensure the propagation of the human race,
this court must prevent plaintiffs from marrying.'3 5
This argument was met head-on by the petitioners in Baker, in which
petitioners stated: Mhe state does not impose upon heterosexual married
couples a condition that they have a proved capacity or declared willingness to
procreate, posing a rhetorical demand that this court must read such condition
into the statute if same-sex marriages are to be prohibited. 6 The court
responded by saying that the classification is no more than theoretically
imperfect. The court added, "We are reminded however, that abstract symmetry
is not demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment.' "
The rationale in Baker was echoed by Judge Hill in Adams v. Howerton, in
which the Judge justified the denial of same-sex marriages using strikingly
similar justification: "[The] main justification in this age for societal
recognition and protection of the institution of marriage is procreation,
perpetuation of the race."58 In that case plaintiff's also argued that some
persons were allowed to marry and their union was given full recognition and
constitutional protection, even though the above stated justification-procreationwas not possible. Judge Hill continued his analysis by saying:
The state has chosen to allow legal marriage as between all couples of
opposite sex. The alternative would be to inquire of each couple, before
issuing a marriage license, as to their plans for children and to give
sterility tests to all applicants, refusing licenses to those found sterile or

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187. 1195 (Wash.1974).
Def. Supp. Mem. at 7.
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). appeal dismLed, 409 U.S. 810 (1971).
Id. at 314.
Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124, 25 (D.C. CaL 190).
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unwilling to raise family. Such tests and inquiries would themselves raise
serious constitutional questions. 9
Even if marriage is protected because it often involves procreation, the
argument that gay and lesbian couples should therefore be denied the right to
marry is without merit.' As the plaintiffs in Gill stated when faced with this
argument, "This of course is nothing but nonsense."" Given current advances
in productive technology-in particular artificial insemination and surrogacy-gay
men and lesbians can easily produce offspring." Thus, allowing gay men and
lesbians to marry would not be inconsistent with the policies favoring
procreation.6 3 In sum, same-sex marriages are wholly consistent with the
theoretical and policy justifications of the previously mentioned state interests.
If court[s] were indeed serious about the interest promoted by the right to
marry-self determination, autonomy from the state and societal and familial
stability-then it should value them for heterosexuals and homosexuals alike and
recognize that the fundamental right to marry should extend to gay and lesbian
couples.'
Even though courts have hidden behind this rationale, they have side-stepped
the issue of whether or not the denial of same-sex marriage meets with
constitutional approval under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Even when courts were willing to face the Fourteenth Amendment
challenges, they have been reluctant to apply the correct analysis that would be
applied to other groups that would trigger Fourteenth Amendment protections.
Courts have consistently applied the rational basis test rather than the test
which should be applied, namely, the strict scrutiny test.

59. Id.
60. Plaintiffs Supp. Men. at 6.
61. Id.
62. Note, Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv. L REv. 1508, 164852 (1989).
63. Id at 1608
64. Id
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SAME-SEX MARRIAGES AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
A SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION

Even within a nation of minorities, American gay and lesbian people
constitute a minority group that elicits an extraordinary high degree of fear and
contempt from society at large and receive an inordinately low degree of state
protection from the institutionalization of that antipathy.' As a result, gays
suffer discrimination in virtually every social sphere. They are denied jobs,
housing, custody of their children, and the right to marry.'
As recent as October 21, 1991 USA Today reported that a purported lesbian
marriage cost Robin Shahar a job within the Georgia Attorney General s
office.67
Recent testimony before the California Legislature by a gay San Francisco
policeman, Mitchell Grobeson revealed that he was forced to resign from the
Los Angeles Police Department in 1988 after officials there orchestrated a
campaign of harassment against him."
Cheryl Sommerville, a cook in Douglasville, Georgia was fired because she
was a lesbian. 6 And the list goes on.

In the wake of the Black civil rights and women's movements, gays have
increasingly sought constitutional protection from this pervasive discrimination.
Thus far, however, their efforts have met with little success.7" Because of this
denial of equal protection of the laws, courts should recognize homosexuality
as a suspect classification under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore subject laws that discriminate (either on their face
or as applied) to strict scrutiny, beyond the rational basis test currently
[used]. 7' To determine whether state statutes defining marriage as a union of
man and woman violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, courts must first decide which tier of scrutiny should be applied.
They must determine whether the class excluded from the right is suspect or
non-suspect, and whether the right at issue is fundamental or not, to decide
whether to examine the legislation in question with strict, heightened, or
65. Note, The ConstiutionalStarus of Sexual Orientation:Homosexuality As A Suspect Classificadon,
98 HARV. L REv. 1285 (1985).

66. Id
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

USA Today, Oct. 21, 1991 at 2, coL 2.
San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 12, 1991 at Al.
The Washington Blade, Sept. 18, 1991 at 13 coL 2.
Note, The Consruaonail Szarus of Sexual Orienzadon:,ssupra note 65.
Id
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minimum scrutiny. If indeed the courts detemine that a suspect class or
fundamental right is invoked they will examine the statute and its treatment,
and will generally strike it down unless it is narrowly tailored to a compelling
state interest.7 2 Homosexuals should be classified as a suspect class and
therefore any statute, as applied or on its face is unconstitutional if it denies
them equal protection under the law.
Before leaping to the bare conclusion that homosexuals are a suspect class,
a number of factors must be analyzed. The Supreme Court has identified
several factors that guide a suspect class inquiry.
The first factor the Court generally considers is whether the group at issue
has suffered a history of purposeful discrimination. 73 "Homosexuals have
historically been the object of pernicious and sustained hostility."74 In High
Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Judge Henderson
realized this same harsh truth: "Lesbians and gays have been the object of some
of the deepest prejudice and hatred in American Society."" Homosexuals have
been the frequent victims of violence and have been excluded from jobs,
schools, housing, churches, and even families. 76 "[Discrimination] faced by
homosexuals in our society is plainly no less pernicious or intense than the
discrimination faced by other groups already treated as suspect classes, such as
aliens or people of a particular national origin."" Moreover, recent incidents
show that homosexuals are continuously subject to discrimination and even
physical injury as a result of homophobia. As recent as November 1991,
hundreds of gays staged a "Take back the night rally" to protest against
harassment, threats and physical violence.78
The second factor that the Supreme Court considers in suspect class analysis
is whether the discrimination embodies a gross unfairness that is sufficiently

Home: Group Homes to the Mentally Retarded, Equal
72. See Minow, When Difference Has It's
Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARv. C.R. - C.L. L REv. I 11,
127 (1987).

73. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1444 (1988).
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inconsistent with the ideals of equal protection to term it invidious. 9 In
weighing this concept of gross unfairness, the Court has considered: (1)
whether the disadvantaged class is defined by a trait that "frequently bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society, ° (2) whether the class
has been saddled with unique disabilities because of prejudice or inaccurate
stereotypes; and (3) whether the trait defining the class is immutable. I will
explore these questions in turn:
Sexual orientation plainly has no relevance to a person's ability to perform
or contribute to society. This irrelevance of sexual orientation to the quality of
a person's contribution to society only suggests that classifications based on
sexual orientation reflect prejudice and inaccurate stereotypes-the second
indicia of a classification of gross unfairness. 8 Moreover, under the second
question, homosexuals have been denied jobs, and other benefits of life that
heterosexuals do not face based on prejudice.
The last characteristic under unfairness is immutability as an indicator of
gross unfairness. The Supreme Court has never held that only classes with
immutable traits can be deemed suspect. The Supreme Court considers
immutability relevant in the sense that members of the class must be physically
unable to change or mask the trait defining their class.' At a minimum, the
Supreme Court is willing to treat trait as effectively immutable if changing it
would involve great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical change or a
traumatic change of identity. In esenee,'[Tmmutability may describe those
traits that are so central to a person's identity that it would be abhorrent for
government to penalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how
easy that change might be physically. " 3 Racial discrimination, for example,
would not suddenly become constitutional fi medical science developed an
easy, cheap, and painless method of changing one's pigment." The courts
have stated: "Under either formulatiion, we have no trouble concluding that
sexual orientation is immutable for the purpose of equal protection doctrine."u9
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Although the causes of homosexuality are not fully understood, research
indicates that we have little control over our sexual orientation and that, once
acquired, our sexual orientation is largely impervious to change.86 The final
factor the Supreme Court considers in suspect class analysis is whether the
group burdened by official discrimination lacks the political power necessary
to obtain redress from the political branches of government. In evaluating
whether a class is politically underrepresented, the Court has focused on
87
whether the class is a "discrete and insular minority."
Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested against
homosexuals once so identified publicly members of this group are particularly
powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political arena. Even when gays
overcome this prejudice enough to participate openly in politics, the general
animus towards homosexuality may render this participation wholly
ineffective.s Elected officials sensitive to public prejudice may refuse to
support legislation that even appears to condone homosexuality.89 Although
some states have passed legislation barring discrimination against gays,
nationally, homosexuals have been wholly unsuccessful at getting legislation
passed that protects them from discrimination.
In view of the factors that the Supreme Court has considered in the past, it
should be concluded as the Watkins Court concluded: "Our analysis of the
relevant factors in determining whether a given group should be considered a
suspect class for the purposes of equal protection doctrine ineluctably leads us
to the conclusion that homosexuals constitute a suspect class."'
Despite, the overwhelming evidence surrounding discriminatory treatment of
homosexuals, courts have used various avenues to keep from directly
addressing the issue. Moreover they have been reluctant to look at homosexuals
as a suspect class. One such case that highlights this is Adams v. Howerton, In
that case a male Australian citizen and male American citizen who went
through a purported ceremony of marriage in Colorado brought action against
the Immigration and Naturalization Service seeking a declaration compelling
granting of immediate relative status to the Australian citizen on grounds that
the administrative denial was an abuse of discretion and an error of law. Chief
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Judge Irving Hill held, 'denial of immediate relative status to the Austrian
citizen did not constitute a denial of constitutional rights under equal
protection."' The court side stepped the equal protection challenge by saying
that Congress has virtually plenary power in immigration matters and is not
bound by otherwise applicable equal protection requirements."' The court
further stated, "I believe the Baker case is controlling, but if for some reason
it is not, I reach the same conclusion under a de novo look at the constitutional
issues. As developed earlier, the main justification in this age for societal
recognition and protection of institution of marriage is procreation, perpetuation
of the race.' 9 The court forcefully drove its point further by adding: "In
traditional equal protection terminology, it seems beyond dispute that the state
has a compelling interest in encouraging and fostering procreation of the race
and providing status and stability to the environment in which children are
raised. This has always been one of society's paramount goals."
Baker is also illuminating on this point. This case involved a mandamus
proceeding for a marriage license between two people of the same sex. The
district court ruled that the Clerk of Court was not required to issue marriage
license to applicants who were of the same sex. The Supreme Court held that
the statute governing marriage does not authorize marriage between persons of
the same sex, and such marriages are accordingly prohibited and that such
statute does not offend the First, Eighth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution." In Baker, the petitioners relied on Loving v.
Virginia, which struck down Virginia's antimiscegenation statutes prohibiting
interracial marriages. The Court went on to justify its holding by saying that,
Loving does indicate that not all state restrictions upon the right to marry
are beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in a
commonsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction
between a marital restriction based upon race and one based upon the
fundamental difference in sex."
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However, what the court failed to recognize is that this is the same type of
disingenuous argument used in Loving, where the clerk claimed he was not
discriminating against the applicants but, instead, his denial was based on a
rational recognition of the applicants lack of qualifications i.e., one was white
and the other Black. Just as defendants' ambiguous claim of the "commonly
understood, reasonable meaning," of marriage did not include same-sex
couples, the defendants in Loving then claimed that the meaning of marriage
did not include racially distinct couples. These arguments are the same ones
deemed to be unconstitutional and strike offensive at the very nature of human
sensibility. " Now, as then, the real issue is justice versus oppression.""
Another disingenuous argument can be found in Singer v. Hara.The Court
held:
[Imt is apparent that the state's refusal to grant a license allowing the
appellant's to marry one another is not based upon appellants' status as
males, but rather it is based upon the state's recognition that our society
as a whole views marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for
procreation and the rearing of children. This is true even though married
couples are not required to become parents and even though not all
couples who produce children are married. Those are exceptional
situations. The fact remains that marriage exists as a protected legal
institution primarily because of societal values associated with the
propagation of the human race. Further it is apparent that no-same-sex
couple offers the possibility of the birth of children by their union. Thus
the refusal of the state to authorize same-sex marriage result from such
impossibility of reproduction rather than from an invidious discrimination
on account of sex.98
Many courts have resorted to the above styled arguments, however, there has
been some movement in recent years. The Court came close to declaring sex
to be a suspect classification when the plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson
stated that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race,
alienage, or national origin are inherently suspect, and must therefore be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."9
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However, with the exception of Watkins v. U.S. Army, homosexuals have not
been regarded as an inherently suspect class."° In that case Judge Norris
held: "[the Court] is compelled] to conclude that homosexuals constitute a
suspect class.""0 '
In the wake of Bowers v. Hardwick many commentators have interpreted its
language as saying that this prohibits homosexuals from marriage. In that case
Chief Justice White held that Georgia's sodomy statute did not violate the
fundamental rights of homosexuals.'02 Despite the holding in Bowers, it must
be noted that the right of homosexuals to marry is unrelated to their right to
engage in sodomy. Just as mormons did not forfeit the right to free exercise of
religion simply because the state proscribed polygamy, (a practice that their
religion once espoused), so too homosexuals do not forfeit
their fundamental
03
right to marry because the state can proscribe sodomy.1
According to the D.C. Court of Appeals, "sexual orientation appears to
possess most or all of the characteristics that have persuaded the Supreme
Court of the United States to employ strict or heightened constitutional
scrutiny to legislative classifications under the Equal Protection Clause."'0 4
The majority in Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University held that gay
men and lesbians are entitled to all of the rights accorded other human beings
in the District and are entitled to the same protections against discrimination
as racial minorities. 5 This is an implicit recognition that gay men and
lesbians, a sexual orientation minority, are in fact a "discrete and insular
minority" similar to racial minorities and therefore, entitled to strict scrutiny as
a matter of equal protection of the laws.
Commentators are virtually unanimous in arguing that the "prohibition on
same-sex marriage cannot withstand any level of scrutiny," much less the
"rigorous scrutiny" required by constitutional precedent "because states cannot
articulate" °6
legitimate interests that are rationally related to the restrictions they
impose. '

100. Watldn v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1448 (9th Cir. nullified on June 8. 1988).

101. Id at 1448
102. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

103. Note, Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation & the Law, 102 HAv. L REv. 1503. n. 23
(1987).
104. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1, 36 (1987).
105. Id at 45-46.
106. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). See also, Friedman. The Necessityfor State Recognition
of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of the Family, 3 BEPI,.EY
WOMEN's L J. 134, 157-60 (1988).

288

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

Even as early as 1971 the Court in Reed v. Reed recognized that
classifications based on sex, classifications based upon race, alienage, and
national origin are inherently suspect."° In Reed, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a Idaho statute providing that, when two people are
otherwise equally qualified to appointment as administrator of an estate, the
male applicant must be preferred to the female. The Court noted that the Idaho
statute provides that different treatment be accorded to the applicants on the
basis of their sex; it thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under
the equal protection clause. The Court went on to say that "to give a mandatory
preference to members of either sex over members of the other.. .is to make
10 8
the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution."
This departure from traditional rational-basis analysis with respect to sexbased classifications is clearly justified. The Court continued its analysis by
saying:
And what differentiates sex from such non-suspect status as intelligence
or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform
or contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions between the
sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of
females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of
its individual members."°
This analysis indeed applies to homosexuals.
In 1970, Justice Thurgood Marshall eloquently stated the test to be applied
in informing a suspect class inquiry, He stated:
In my view, equal protection analysis... is not appreciably advanced by
a prior definition of a right, fundamental or otherwise. Rather
concentration must be placed upon the character of the classification in
question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the
asserted state interests in support of the classification." 0
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If courts would apply this test and not let their decisions be informed by
what they believe to be traditional or moral-then Justice Marshall's test would
lead them to place sex into the fulcrum of a suspect classification.

CONCLUSION

I would urge courts to rethink their positions on denial of equal protection
to homosexuals in reference to marriage. Further, I would strenuously urge
them to adopt the Watkins rationale. Moreover, there is no public policy or
legal reason as to why same-marriages should not be allowed. From a review
of court opinions on this subject; it is obvious that the courts have no legal
reasons to deny any citizen equal protection of the laws. Maybe the courts
reluctance is well- grounded in morals, values, and tradition, but these words
do not and should not be allowed to continue to usurp constitutional guarantees
afforded us all.
The following quote is illuminating on this point:
Homosexual marriage shakes the existing moral order to its core. Yet
society may have to abide with a touch of moral uncertainty out of respect
for our constitutional commitment to equality and our moral commitment
to justice and care. The morality of marriage is that of caring and shared
commitment. The mutual promise, induced by love, to act responsibly
towards one another. To be fully respected as members of the community,
homosexual couples must be treated as capable of taking on that. Perhaps
there will come a time when we see that what turns any
relationship-between man and woman, man and man, or between woman
and woman-into a moral one is the existence of love and devotion to one
another, and that the mode of expressing love is fundamentally a private
rather than a state concern. We shield that love from the states judgment
because the relationship at stake takes precedent over the possible offense
the thought of certain expressions of love may cause to distant third
t
parties."
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Just as Ozzie and Harriet were allowed to share in their perfect world; there
will come a time when Ozzie and Harry will also be allowed to share in their
perfect marital world. However, this will not come about without a persistent
fight in the courts. As recent as January 4, 1992 the Washington Post reported
that a District of Columbia Judge Shelie F. Bowers rejected a lawsuit by Craig
112
R. Dean and Patrick G. Gill in which they sought the right to marry.
Notwithstanding the above case, and others that will no doubt follow, there will
indeed come a time when Ozzie and Harry will walk down the church isle and
share in the matrimonial bliss that will be sanctioned by the state!! The United
States Constitution demands nothing less. Equal protection under the law is a
basic tenet of the Constitution, and courts can make no exceptions because
same-sex marriages are seen as morally reprehensible.
I am constantly reminded that it wasn't long ago that courts thought it was
morally correct for them to deny Blacks the right to vote. The denial of that
right is no less pernicious than the denial of same-sex marriages.
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